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Abstract—Estimation of an unknown deterministic vector from
quantized sensor data is considered in the presence of spoofing
attacks which alter the data presented to several sensors. Con-
trary to previous work, a generalized attack model is employed
which manipulates the data using transformations with arbitrary
functional forms determined by some attack parameters whose
values are unknown to the attacked system. For the first time,
necessary and sufficient conditions are provided under which
the transformations provide a guaranteed attack performance in
terms of Cramer-Rao Bound (CRB) regardless of the processing
the estimation system employs, thus defining a highly desirable
attack. Interestingly, these conditions imply that, for any such
attack when the attacked sensors can be perfectly identified
by the estimation system, either the Fisher Information Matrix
(FIM) for jointly estimating the desired and attack parameters is
singular or that the attacked system is unable to improve the CRB
for the desired vector parameter through this joint estimation
even though the joint FIM is nonsingular. It is shown that it is
always possible to construct such a highly desirable attack by
properly employing a sufficiently large dimension attack vector
parameter relative to the number of quantization levels employed,
which was not observed previously. To illustrate the theory in
a concrete way, we also provide some numerical results which
corroborate that under the highly desirable attack, attacked data
is not useful in reducing the CRB.
Index Terms—Spoofing attack, distributed vector parameter
estimation, Cramer-Rao Bound, the Expectation-Maximization
algorithm, sensor network.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent developments in sensor technology have encouraged
a large number of applications of sensor networks for param-
eter estimation ranging from inexpensive commercial systems
to complex military and homeland defense surveillance sys-
tems [1]. Typically, large-scale sensor networks are comprised
of low-cost and spatially distributed sensor nodes with limited
battery power and low computing capacity, which makes the
system vulnerable to cyberattacks by adversaries. This has led
to great interest in studying the vulnerability of sensor net-
works in various applications and from different perspectives,
see [2]–[10] and the references therein. Due to the dominance
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of digital technology, a great deal of attention has focused
on parameter estimation using quantized data [11]–[15]. The
sequel considers the problem of estimating a vector parameter
by using quantized data collected from a distributed sensor
network under the assumption that the measurements from
several subsets of sensors have been falsified by spoofing
attacks, a topic that has received virtually no attention to date.
To be specific, the spoofing attacks maliciously modify the
temporal analog measurements of the phenomenon acquired
at the subset of attacked sensors.
A. System and Adversary Models
Consider a distributed sensor network SN = {1, 2, ..., N}
consisting of N spatially distributed sensors, with each making
some measurements of a particular phenomenon. We assume
that the j-th sensor acquires Kj measurements, and we denote
the before-attack measurement of the j-th sensor at time
instant k by xjk which follows a probability density function
(pdf) fjk (xjk |θ ) depending on an unknown deterministic
vector parameter θ with dimension Dθ that is to be estimated
from the measurements. For simplicity, we assume that the
measurements {xjk} are statistically independent but not
necessarily identically distributed.
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Fig. 1: Distributed Estimation System in the Presence of
Spoofing Attacks.
The adversaries alter the physical phenomenon as in Fig. 1,
thus tampering with the measurements at a subset of sensors
in the sensor network, hoping to undermine the estimation
performance of the system. Let V ⊂ SN denote the set of
sensors undergoing spoofing attacks while the set U ∆= SN\V
2represents the set of unattacked sensors. A generalized math-
ematical model of spoofing attacks which maliciously modify
the distribution of the analog observations of the physical
phenomenon at the attacked sensors is considered employing
general probability density functions {fjk} and {gjk} which
depend on the desired and attack vector parameters. To con-
form to previous work, the functional forms of the attacks, thus
{fjk} and {gjk}, are assumed known to the attacked system
but the desired and attack vector parameters are not. Thus,
the after-attack version x˜jk of xjk obeys the statistical model
that1 {x˜jk} is independent and
x˜jk ∼
{
fjk (x˜jk |θ ) , if j ∈ U
gjk
(
x˜jk
∣∣θ, ξ(j) ) , if j ∈ V , (1)
where if j ∈ V , the after-attack pdf gjk(xjk|θ, ξ(j)) is
parameterized by the desired vector parameter θ and the
attack vector parameter ξ(j). It is worth mentioning that the
notation gjk(xjk |θ, ξ(j)) does not imply that the after-attack
pdf gjk(xjk|θ, ξ(j)) of the measurements at the j-th sensor
has to depend on θ. For example, the adversaries can intercept
the signal from the physical phenomenon and generate a new
signal using some different pdf solely based on its attack
vector parameter. A detailed example of a practical attack of
the type described in (1) is provided in Section II.
The set V of attacked sensors can be divided into disjoint
subsets {Ap}Pp=1 in terms of distinct attack vector parameters
{ξ(j)} such that
V =
P
∪
p=1
Ap, and Al ∩ Am = ∅, ∀l 6= m, (2)
where the attacked sensors in the subset Ap are known by
the system under attack to employ an identical attack vector
parameter τ (p) with dimension Dp so that ξ(j) = τ (p),
∀j ∈ Ap. The identical attack vectors are possibly due to
the sensors in Ap being attacked by the same attacker. For the
sake of notational simplicity, we use A0 to denote the set U
of unattacked sensors.
Due to the communications employed, each sensor is re-
stricted to convert analog measurements to digital data before
transmitting this data to the fusion center (FC) as shown
in Fig. 1. At the j-th sensor, each after-attack measurement
x˜jk is quantized to u˜jk by using a Rj-level quantizer with
quantization regions {I(r)j }
Rj
r=1, that is,
u˜jk =
Rj∑
r=1
r1
{
x˜jk ∈ I
(r)
j
}
, (3)
where 1{·} is the indicator function. We adopt this general
quantization model due to the fact that optimized quantization
regions {I(r)j }
Rj
r=1 for different sensors can be very different,
since the measurements from different sensors do not neces-
sarily obey an identical pdf [13], [16]. We assume that the
quantizer design {I(r)j }
Rj
r=1 for each sensor is predefined and
known to the FC, but not the attacker.
1The notations x˜jk and u˜jk denote the after-attack analog measurements
and the corresponding quantized measurements.
Let Θ denote a vector containing the unknown parameter
θ along with all the unknown attack vector parameters which
parameterize the spoofing attacks in the sensor network
Θ
∆
=
[
θT ,
(
τ (1)
)T
, ...,
(
τ (P )
)T]T
. (4)
For the sake of notational simplicity in the following parts, we
use p
(k)
jr to denote the after-attack probability mass function
(pmf) of the quantized measurement u˜jk evaluated at u˜jk = r,
that is,
p
(k)
jr
∆
=Pr (u˜jk = r |Θ )
=
{∫
I
(r)
j
fjk (x˜jk|θ ) dx˜jk , ∀j ∈ A0∫
I
(r)
j
gjk
(
x˜jk
∣∣θ, τ (p) ) dx˜jk, ∀j ∈ Ap, ∀p ≥ 1 . (5)
For simplicity, the communication channel between the FC
and each sensor is assumed ideal, and hence the FC is able
to accurately receive what was transmitted from both the
unattacked and attacked sensors. After receiving the quantized
data from all sensors, the FC attempts to make an estimate
of the desired vector parameter without knowledge of which
sensors have been attacked nor the attack parameters used by
the attackers.
B. Performance Metric
It is of considerable interest to investigate the performance
of spoofing attacks, and mathematically characterize the class
of the most devastating spoofing attacks under the assumption
that the adversaries have no information about what com-
putations the FC is using. This paper develops guarantees
for the attacker’s performance that are independent of the
computations performed at the FC. It is clear that if the FC
has the information about the groupings of similarly attacked
sensors, i.e., {Ap}, it can use this information to improve
estimation performance over the case where this information
is not employed. The FC can always do better in estimating the
desired vector parameter with extra knowledge. Therefore, for
spoofing attacks employing some specific {fjk(xjk|θ)} and
{gjk(x˜jk|θ, τ (p))}, the case where the compromised sensors
are correctly categorized into P different groups according
to distinct types of attacks corresponds to the case where
the FC has the best chance to combat the spoofing attacks.
In other words, the best possible estimation performance
(smallest error) under this case provides a lower bound on
the estimation performance for any other cases, which implies
that the corresponding spoofing attack performance under this
case provides a guaranteed attack performance in degrading
the estimation performance no matter what computations the
FC is using. The recent work in [8] has shown that for
some classes of spoofing attacks, with a sufficient number
of observations, the FC is able to perfectly identify the set
of unattacked sensors and categorize the attacked sensors into
different groups according to distinct types of spoofing attacks.
For these reasons, we adopt the following definition of the
optimal guaranteed degradation spoofing attacks in this paper.
Definition 1: Consider attacks employing {fjk(xjk |θ)}
and {gjk(x˜jk|θ, τ (p))}. The optimal guaranteed degradation
3spoofing attack (OGDSA) maximizes the degradation2 of the
Cramer-Rao Bound (CRB) for the vector parameter of interest
at the FC when the attacked sensors are well identified and
categorized according to distinct types of spoofing attacks by
the FC.
The estimation performance for a vector parameter in a
distributed sensor network can be expressed using an error
correlation matrix. However, in most cases, a closed form
expression for the error correlation matrix is intractable. Thus
the CRB, an asymptotically achievable lower bound on the
error correlation matrix, is employed in Definition 1. It is
worth mentioning that the optimal guaranteed degradation
spoofing attack defined in Definition 1 achieves the classical
definition of attack optimality (largest CRB) for the scenario
where the FC has the best chance to combat the spoofing
attacks. It might not be the classically optimal spoofing attack
for the scenario where the FC is unable to determine which
sensors are attacked, or to classify sensors into groups of
distinct types of spoofing attacks. However, the OGDSAs
defined in Definition 1 can provide a guarantee that the actual
degradation in the CRB must exceed some critical value no
matter what computations the estimation system employs. This
guarantee makes OGDSA an excellent spoofing attack from
the adversary’s point of view.
C. Summary of Results and Main Contributions
Unlike previous work, a generalized attack model is em-
ployed which manipulates the data using transformations with
arbitrary functional forms determined by some attack param-
eters whose values are unknown to the attacked system. For
the first time, necessary and sufficient conditions are provided
under which these transformations provide an OGDSA. These
conditions imply that, for an OGDSA, either the Fisher Infor-
mation Matrix (FIM) under the conditions of Definition 1 for
jointly estimating the desired and attack parameters is singular
or that the attacked system is unable to improve the CRB
under the conditions of Definition 1 for the desired vector
parameter through this joint estimation even though the joint
FIM is nonsingular. It is shown that when the number of
temporal measurements at each sensor is given, it is always
possible to construct an OGDSA by properly employing a
sufficiently large dimension attack vector parameter relative
to the number of quantization levels employed, which was
not observed previously. It is shown that a spoofing attack can
render the attacked measurements useless in terms of reducing
the CRB under the conditions of Definition 1 for estimating
the desired vector parameter if and only if it is an OGDSA.
None of these contributions are provided in the previous work.
In order to illustrate the theory just described in a concrete
way, we also provide some numerical results. For a specific
class of OGDSAs, an enhanced Expectation-Maximization-
based algorithm that attempts to use all the attacked and
unattacked data to jointly estimate the desired and attack
parameters is shown, for a sufficient number of observations,
to essentially achieve the CRB which knows which sensors
are attacked and only uses data from unattacked sensors.
2See (33) for example.
For completeness, we specify the Expectation-Maximization-
based algorithm for general attacks and enhance it with a
heuristic rounding approach previously suggested by others in
a different application which seems to significantly improve
the Expectation-Maximization-based algorithm. The purpose
of the algorithm and numerical results is to illustrate the
properties of OGDSAs. The numerical results demonstrate
that a representative algorithm which tries to use the attacked
data is not able to obtain performance that is better than the
best achievable performance of an approach that ignores the
attacked data.
D. Related Work
In recent years, estimation problems under different attacks
have seen great interest in various engineering applications, see
[2]–[10], [17]–[20] and the references therein. Rather than the
man-in-the-middle attacks which falsify the data transmitted
from the sensors to the FC [5]–[7], we are primarily interested
in spoofing attacks in this paper, which maliciously modify
the measurements of the physical phenomenon at a subset of
sensors, see Fig. 1.
Spoofing attacks have been widely considered in wireless
sensor networks, smart grids, radar systems and sonar systems
[2]–[4], [8], [10], [17]–[21]. Each of these recent works takes
one specific type of spoofing attack into account, and inves-
tigates the attack performance or the estimation performance.
In this paper, we don’t focus on one specific type of spoofing
attack. Instead, we consider a generalized attack model which
can describe the different kinds of spoofing attacks employed
in all recent work, and moreover, we make use of this
generalized model to provide uniform tools to test if a spoofing
attack is optimal in our defined sense. In [19] and [20], the
authors only considered one specific functional form of the
spoofing attacks, the so-called data-injection attacks, so they
do not address which functional forms are optimum. Further,
the work in [19] and [20] is only for smart grid systems, while
our work is very general.
Another difference between our work and the other recent
work on spoofing attacks in [2]–[4], [10], [17]–[21] is that
we consider estimation based on quantized data which is
typically the case in practice. Interestingly, we show that the
quantization limits the capability of the estimation system to
combat the spoofing attacks. In particular, it is shown that
the adversaries can launch a class of quantization induced
OGDSAs which are easily constructed in practice.
E. Notation and Organization
Throughout this paper, bold upper case letters and bold
lower case letters are used to denote matrices and column
vectors respectively. The symbol 1{·} stands for the indicator
function. Let [A]i,j denote the element in the i-th row and
j-th column of the matrix A, and R(A) represents the range
space of A. A ≻ 0 and A  0 imply that the matrix
is positive definite and positive semidefinite respectively. To
avoid cumbersome sub-matrix and sub-vector expressions in
this paper, we introduce the following notation. The notation
[A]S,: stands for the sub-matrix of A which consists of the
4elements with row indices in the set S, and [A]1:N represents
the N -by-N leading principle minor of A. The i-th element
of the vector v is denoted by vi, and [v]S represents the sub-
vector of v which only contains the elements with indices in
the set S. The symbols ∇vf and ∇2vf respectively signify
the gradient and Hessian of f with respect to v. Finally,
the expectation and rank operators are denoted by E (·) and
rank(·) respectively.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Some
illustrative example of a practical spoofing attack is introduced
in Section II. Section III provides the necessary and sufficient
conditions for the OGDSAs. A joint attack identification and
parameter estimation approach is developed in Section IV,
which is used in Section V to corroborate our theoretical
results. Finally, Section VI provides our conclusions.
II. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE OF A PRACTICAL SPOOFING
ATTACK
Spoofing attacks on sensor networks can occur in various
engineering applications. For instance, spoofing attacks have
been described for the localization problem in wireless sensor
networks, see [2], [3] and the references therein. Table I in
[2] provides a summary of different types of spoofing attack
threats for the localization problem. The dangers of spoofing
attacks in the Global Positioning System (GPS) that controls
everything from car navigation to national power grids have
drawn serious public concern [22], [23]. Radar and sonar
systems also suffer from spoofing attack threats in practice. As
one example of a spoofing attack technique, the application of
an electronic countermeasure (ECM), which is designed to jam
or deceive the radar or sonar system, can critically degrade the
detection and estimation performance of the system [24]. One
popular technique for the implementation of ECM employs
digital radio frequency memory (DRFM) in radar systems
to manipulate the received signal and retransmit it back to
confuse the victim radar system. DRFM can mislead the
estimation of the range of the target by altering the delay in
transmission of pulses, and fool the system into incorrectly
estimating the velocity of the target by introducing a Doppler
shift in the retransmitted signal [17]. An example of a spoofing
attack created by nature is environmental variation in shallow
water sonar systems. According to waveguide-invariant theory
[25], the environmental variation, such as sound-speed or
water-depth perturbations, essentially introduces an apparent
shift in the position of the target of interest when the data is
processed by matched field processing [21], [26]. Hence these
environmental variations can be treated as spoofing attacks
which falsify the physical model of the received signal in sonar
systems. More recently, the data-injection attack considered in
smart grids is another typical example of a spoofing attack, see
[4], [18]–[20] and the references therein.
In order to motivate the mathematical description of spoof-
ing attacks, we consider a spoofing attack utilizing a DRFM
in a radar system as an example, which stores the received
signal and strategically retransmits it back by introducing an
additional delay to mislead the estimation of the range of the
target. In the absence of spoofing attacks, the simplified signal
model of the k-th measurement xjk at the j-th receiver at time
instant tjk, which ignores the Doppler shift, can be expressed
as
xjk =
√
Ejajs (tjk − θj) + njk, (6)
where s(·), Ej and aj respectively represent the transmitted
signal, the transmitted energy, and the reflection coefficient.
The time delay is denoted by θj which is the parameter to
be estimated. We assume that the clutter-plus-noise njk is a
zero-mean Gaussian random variable with known variance σ2j
while all other quantities in (6) are deterministic. As a result,
the pdf fjk(xjk|θj) of xjk in the absence of spoofing attacks
is given by3
fjk (xjk |θj ) = N
(√
Ejajs (tjk − θj) , σ
2
j
)
. (7)
In the presence of a spoofing attack, the after-attack measure-
ment x˜jk can be described as
x˜jk =
√
Ejajs (tjk − θj − ξj) + njk, (8)
where ξj is the delay introduced by the DRFM. Therefore, we
can obtain the corresponding after-attack pdf of x˜jk
gjk (x˜jk |θj , ξj ) = N
(√
Ejajs (tjk − θj − ξj) , σ
2
j
)
= fjk (x˜jk |θj + ξj ) . (9)
In this example, the after-attack pdf gjk(x˜jk|θj , ξj) and the
before-attack pdf fjk(xjk|θj) are in the same family as shown
in (9), i.e., the family of Gaussian distributions with the same
variance σ2j . While this may not always be true, the after-
attack pdf is generally not only parameterized by the desired
parameter θj but also by an unknown attack parameter ξj .
Motivated by this example and other popular spoofing attack
examples, such as those in [2]–[4], [8], [17]–[21], the essential
impact of a spoofing attack at the j-th sensor is to maliciously
modify the measurements at the j-th sensor in a manner
similar to (8). Hence, any given spoofing attack at the j-
th sensor can be described as a mapping which maps the
before-attack pdfs {fjk(xjk|θ)} of the measurements at the
j-th sensor to the after-attack pdfs {gjk(xjk|θ, ξ(j))}, where
θ and ξ(j) account for the desired vector parameter and the
attack vector parameter at the j-th sensor which represents
those deterministic unknowns which can determine the after-
attack pdfs.
III. THE OPTIMALITY OF SPOOFING ATTACKS
In this section, we pursue the explicit characterization of the
optimal spoofing attack as per Definition 1. The adversaries
can attempt to maximize the CRB for θ to achieve an optimal
spoofing attack as per Definition 1. Hence, we first formulate
the FIM for estimating Θ in the following, and then based
on the expression of the FIM, we provide the necessary and
sufficient conditions for the optimal spoofing attack as per
Definition 1.
The FIM JΘ for estimating Θ is defined as [27]
[JΘ]l,m
∆
= −E
{
∂2L (Θ)
∂Θl∂Θm
}
, (10)
3N (a, b) denotes a Gaussian pdf with mean a and variance b.
5where L (Θ) denotes the log-likelihood function.
When the attacked senors are well identified and categorized
into different groups according to distinct types of spoofing
attacks, the log-likelihood function L (Θ) in (10) evaluated at
u˜
∆
=[u˜11, u˜12, ..., u˜1K1 , u˜21, ..., u˜NKN ]
T =r
can be expressed as4
L (Θ) = lnPr (u˜ = r |Θ )
=
P∑
p=0
∑
j∈Ap
Kj∑
k=1
Rj∑
r=1
1 {rjk = r} ln p
(k)
jr (11)
by employing (5).
By substituting the expression of the log-likelihood function
L (Θ) in (11) into the definition of the FIM in (10), it can be
shown that the FIM JΘ for Θ takes the form
JΘ
∆
=


Jθ B1 B2 · · · BP
BT1 Jτ (1) 0 · · · 0
BT2 0 Jτ (2)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. 0
BTP 0 · · · 0 Jτ (P )


(12)
where Jθ ∈ RDθ×Dθ , Jτ (p) ∈ RDp×Dp , and Bp ∈ RDθ×Dp
for all p = 1, 2, ..., P . Moreover, following from (4), (10) and
(11), we can obtain that ∀p
Jτ (p) =
∑
j∈Ap
Kj∑
k=1
Rj∑
r=1
1
p
(k)
jr
∂p
(k)
jr
∂τ (p)
[
∂p
(k)
jr
∂τ (p)
]T
(13)
Bp =
∑
j∈Ap
Kj∑
k=1
Rj∑
r=1
1
p
(k)
jr
∂p
(k)
jr
∂θ
[
∂p
(k)
jr
∂τ (p)
]T
, (14)
and
Jθ =
P∑
p=0
JAp , (15)
where JAp , which is contributed from the measurements
observed at the sensors in Ap, is defined as
JAp =
∑
j∈Ap
Kj∑
k=1
Rj∑
r=1
1
p
(k)
jr
∂p
(k)
jr
∂θ
[
∂p
(k)
jr
∂θ
]T
. (16)
Let Np denote the number of sensors in Ap, and let {jpi }
Np
i=1
stand for the indices of the sensors in Ap. For each p, we define
two matrices
Φθ(p)
∆
=
[
φθ
(p)
j
p
1 11
, φθ
(p)
j
p
1 12
, ..., φθ
(p)
j
p
1 1Rjp1
, φθ
(p)
j
p
1 21
, ..., φθ
(p)
j
p
1 2Rjp1
,
φθ
(p)
j
p
1 31
...., φθ
(p)
j
p
1Kjp
1
R
j
p
1
, φθ
(p)
j
p
2 11
, ..., φθ
(p)
j
p
Np
K
j
p
N
R
j
p
Np
]
, (17)
4Note that if p(k)jr = 0 for some j, k and r, then we just need to eliminate
the corresponding summand in (11). Hence, without loss of generality, we
assume p
(k)
jr > 0.
and
Φτ (p)
∆
=
[
φτ
(p)
j
p
1 11
, φτ
(p)
j
p
1 12
, ..., φτ
(p)
j
p
1 1Rjp
1
, φτ
(p)
j
p
1 21
, ..., φθ
(p)
j
p
1 2Rjp
1
,
φτ
(p)
j
p
1 31
...., φτ
(p)
j
p
1Kjp
1
R
j
p
1
, φτ
(p)
j
p
2 11
, ..., φτ
(p)
j
p
Np
K
j
p
N
R
j
p
Np
]
, (18)
where the vectors φθ(p)jkr and φτ
(p)
jkr in (17) and (18) are given
by
φθ
(p)
jkr
∆
=
√
1
p
(k)
jr
∂p
(k)
jr
∂θ
and φτ
(p)
jkr
∆
=
√
1
p
(k)
jr
∂p
(k)
jr
∂τ (p)
. (19)
By employing the singular value decomposition of Φθ(p)
and Φτ (p) for all p
Φτ (p)=Uτ (p)Λτ (p)V
T
τ (p) and Φθ(p)=Uθ(p)Λθ(p)V
T
θ(p) , (20)
the expressions of Jτ (p) , Bp, and Jθ in (13)–(15) can be
written in compact forms following
Jτ (p) = Φτ (p)Φ
T
τ (p)
= Uτ (p)Λτ (p)Λ
T
τ (p)
UT
τ (p)
, (21)
Bp = Φθ(p)Φ
T
τ (p)
, (22)
and
Jθ =
P∑
p=0
JAp =
P∑
p=0
Φθ(p)Φ
T
θ(p)
=
P∑
p=0
Uθ(p)Λθ(p)Λ
T
θ(p)
UT
θ(p)
. (23)
A. Inestimable Spoofing Attacks
Next we show that just due to the sensor system employing
a quantization with a limited alphabet, the adversaries can
launch a class of spoofing attacks which bring about a singular
FIM JΘ due to the singularity of Jτ (p) for some p ∈
{1, 2, ..., P}. We formally define these inestimable spoofing
attacks as follows.
Definition 2 (Inestimable spoofing attack): The p-th spoof-
ing attack is referred to as an inestimable spoofing attack (ISA)
if the corresponding Jτ (p) defined in (13) is singular.
From (13), we have the following result with regard to the
singularity of Jτ (p) .
Theorem 1: For the p-th spoofing attack, if the dimension
Dp of the attack parameter τ (p) satisfies
Dp >
∑
j∈Ap
Kj (Rj − 1), (24)
then Jτ (p) is singular, and furthermore, the FIM JΘ is also
singular.
Proof: It is clear that
Rj∑
r=1
p
(k)
jr = 1, (25)
for all j and k. Hence, we can obtain that
Rj∑
r=1
∂p
(k)
jr
∂τ (p)
= 0, ∀j and k, (26)
6which yields
rank

 Rj∑
r=1
∂p
(k)
jr
∂τ (p)
[
∂p
(k)
jr
∂τ (p)
]T ≤ Rj − 1, ∀j and k. (27)
Thus, the rank of Jτ (p) is bounded above as per
rank (Jτ (p)) = rank

∑
j∈Ap
Kj∑
k=1
Rj∑
r=1
1
p
(k)
jr
∂p
(k)
jr
∂τ (p)
[
∂p
(k)
jr
∂τ (p)
]T
≤
∑
j∈Ap
Kj∑
k=1
rank

 Rj∑
r=1
∂p
(k)
jr
∂τ (p)
[
∂p
(k)
jr
∂τ (p)
]T
≤
∑
j∈Ap
Kj (Rj − 1). (28)
Since Jτ (p) is a Dp-by-Dp positive semidefinite matrix, we
know that Jτ (p) is singular if Dp >
∑
j∈Ap
Kj (Rj − 1).
Finally, the proof concludes by noting that JΘ is singular as
long as Jτ (p) is singular.
The proof of Theorem 1 demonstrates that the rank of
Jτ (p) is upper bounded by the sum in (28) which is de-
termined by the number of temporal measurements and the
size of the alphabet set employed at each sensor under the
p-th spoofing attack. This implies that when the number of
temporal measurements at each attacked sensor is given, the
numbers of quantization levels employed at the compromised
sensors will limit the size of the attack vector parameter the
quantized estimation system can estimate with an accuracy
that increases with more observations. Theorem 1 provides a
sufficient condition under which inestimable spoofing attacks
can be launched. Thus, these inestimable spoofing attacks,
which are quantization induced, can be easily constructed
in practice, even without any information about the value
of θ and the quantization regions {I(r)j } at each sensor.
Further, if the adversaries have knowledge of the number
of quantization levels of each attacked sensor and the num-
ber of temporal measurements at each attacked sensor, they
know the minimum size of the attack vector parameter they
can employ to ensure an inestimable spoofing attack. One
simple example of an inestimable spoofing attack employs
Dp >
∑
j∈Ap
Kj (Rj − 1) and
x˜jk =
Dp∑
i=1
τ
(p)
i (xjk)
i
. (29)
If (24) is not satisfied, the inestimability is determined by
the {I(r)j } employed at the attacked sensors and the set of
after-attack pdfs {gjk(xjk|θ, τ (p))}. From (21), it is seen that
the inestimability of the p-th spoofing attack is equivalent to
rank (Λτ (p)) < Dp. (30)
In the presence of inestimable spoofing attacks, the FIM
JΘ for joint estimation of the desired vector parameter and the
attack vector parameters is singular, which implies that the FC
is unable to improve the estimation of θ via jointly estimating
θ and the attack vector parameters in the CRB sense. If (30)
is true for all p = 1, 2, ..., P , this means the best the FC can
do in this sense is to estimate θ using only unattacked data,
and hence the CRB for θ in such case can be obtained as
CRBISA (θ) = J−1A0 = Uθ(0)
(
Λθ(0)Λ
T
θ(0)
)−1
UTθ(0) (31)
by employing (23).
B. Optimal Estimable Spoofing Attacks
In this subsection, we focus on estimable spoofing attacks
(defined next), and obtain the necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for the optimal estimable spoofing attacks via FIM
analysis.
Definition 3 (Estimable spoofing attack): The p-th spoof-
ing attack is said to be estimable if the corresponding Jτ (p)
defined in (13) is nonsingular.
Without loss of generality, we assume all spoofing attacks
are estimable in this subsection. Otherwise, we can eliminate
the observations at ISA sensors, and just consider the joint
estimation of the desired vector parameter θ and the estimable
attack vector parameters.
From (12) and (15), we can obtain the CRB for θ in the
presence of estimable spoofing attacks as
[
J−1
Θ
]
1:Dθ
=
(
Jθ −
P∑
p=1
BpJ
−1
τ (p)
BTp
)−1
=
[
JA0 +
P∑
p=1
(
JAp −BpJ
−1
τ (p)
BTp
)]−1
. (32)
In the following theorem, we provide an upper bound on
the CRB for θ in (32) in the positive semidefinite sense.
Theorem 2: In the presence of estimable spoofing attacks,
the CRB for θ is bounded above as per
CRBESA (θ)
∆
=
[
J−1
Θ
]
1:Dθ
 J−1A0 . (33)
Equality in (33) holds if and only if ∀p = 1, 2, ..., P ,
R
(
Vθ(p)Λ
T
θ(p)
)
⊆ R
(
Vτ (p)Λ
T
τ (p)
)
. (34)
Proof: Let’s first examine the term in the sum in (32).
Noticing by (21), (22) and (23), we can obtain
JAp −BpJ
−1
τ (p)
BTp
=Φθ(p)Φ
T
θ(p)
−Φθ(p)Φ
T
τ (p)
(
Φτ (p)Φ
T
τ (p)
)−1
Φτ (p)Φ
T
θ(p)
. (35)
Denote
D
∆
=
(
Φτ (p)Φ
T
τ (p)
)−1
Φτ (p)Φ
T
θ(p)
, (36)
then by employing (35), we can obtain that
JAp −BpJ
−1
τ (p)
BTp
=
(
ΦT
θ(p)
−ΦT
τ (p)
D
)T (
ΦT
θ(p)
−ΦT
τ (p)
D
)
 0. (37)
What’s more, the equality in (37) is attained if and only if
ΦTθ(p) −Φ
T
τ (p)D = 0, ∀p ≥ 1. (38)
By employing (20) and (36), (38) is equivalent to ∀p ≥ 1,
Vτ (p)
[
I−ΛT
τ (p)
(
Λτ (p)Λ
T
τ (p)
)−1
Λτ (p)
]
VT
τ (p)
Vθ(p)Λ
T
θ(p)
=0,
7which implies
R
(
Vθ(p)Λ
T
θ(p)
)
⊆ R
(
Vτ (p)Λ
T
τ (p)
)
, ∀p ≥ 1. (39)
Consequently, from (32), (37), and (39), we can conclude that[
J−1
Θ
]
1:Dθ
 J−1A0 , (40)
with equality if and only if ∀p = 1, 2, ..., P ,
R
(
Vθ(p)Λ
T
θ(p)
)
⊆ R
(
Vτ (p)Λ
T
τ (p)
)
. (41)
In Theorem 2, we provide the necessary and sufficient
conditions under which the estimable spoofing attacks can
deteriorate the CRB for estimating θ to its upper bound
as shown in (33). We formally define this class of optimal
estimable spoofing attacks next.
Definition 4 (Optimal Estimable Spoofing Attack): An es-
timable spoofing attack which satisfies the necessary and
sufficient condition in (34) is called an optimal estimable
spoofing attack (OESA).
The physical meanings of the terms in (32) and the insight
into Theorem 2 deserve some discussion. The term JA0
represents the information on θ embedded in the data from
A0, while JAp indicates the information on θ that can be
provided by the data from Ap if τ (p) is known to the FC. The
term BpJ−1τ (p)B
T
p specifies the degradation of the information
on θ from Ap, which is induced by the uncertainty of τ (p).
By considering the interpretations of these terms, the insight
into Theorem 2 is that if and only if (34) holds, the uncertainty
of τ (p) can reduce the information on θ conveyed by the data
from Ap to 0 in which case the sum in the inverse does not
contribute to (32). Moreover, Theorem 2 points out that the
degradation BpJ−1τ (p)B
T
p cannot be strictly larger than JAp .
There is another interesting interpretation of (34). We define
the pmf vector ψ(j,k)p of the k-th measurement at the j-th
sensor which is under the p-th spoofing attack as
ψ(j,k)p
∆
=
[
p
(k)
j1 , p
(k)
j2 , ..., p
(k)
jRj
]T
, (42)
where the after-attack pmf p(k)jr is defined in (5). It can be
shown that (34) is equivalent to the existence of a vector
α(p,i) = [α
(p,i)
1 , α
(p,i)
2 , ..., α
(p,i)
Dp
]T such that for all j ∈ Ap
and all k,
∂ψ
(j,k)
p
∂θi
=
Dp∑
l=1
α
(p,i)
l
∂ψ
(j,k)
p
∂τ
(p)
l
. (43)
The relationship in (43) demonstrates that for all j and all k,
the change of the pmf vector ψ(j,k)p induced by changing each
θi can be reproduced by a linear combination of the changes
of the pmf vector ψ(j,k)p induced by changing the elements of
τ (p). This implies the FC will be unable to distinguish changes
in the attack vector parameter τ (p) from changes in the desired
vector parameter θ, based on the observations, which severely
hinders estimation.
Theorem 2 also describes how to design optimal estimable
spoofing attacks. The adversaries choose {gjk(xjk|θ, τ (p))}
to meet the necessary and sufficient condition in (34). One
trivial example of OESA, which may be relatively easy to
detect, is to replace the original measurements at the attacked
sensors by some regenerated data obeying a distribution not
parameterized by θ, which leads to Φθ(p) = 0 for all p ≥ 1,
and therefore, (34) is satisfied. In the following part, some
typical OESA examples of practical interest are investigated.
Corollary 1: If the spoofing attacks are such that for any
p ≥ 1, ∃λp satisfying
Φθ(p) = λpΦτ (p) , (44)
then the CRB [J−1
Θ
]1:Dθ for θ will be maximized in the
positive semidefinite sense, more specifically[
J−1
Θ
]
1:Dθ
= J−1A0 . (45)
Furthermore, the necessary and sufficient condition under
which (44) is satisfied for any θ, τ (p) and {I(r)j } is that
∀j ∈ Ap and for all k, the after-attack pdf gjk(xjk |θ, τ (p))
can be expressed as
gjk
(
xjk
∣∣∣θ, τ (p)) = g˜jk (xjk ∣∣∣λpθ + τ (p)) , (46)
for some g˜jk.
Proof: Note that if for any p ≥ 1, ∃λp such that
Φθ(p) = λpΦτ (p) , (47)
then ∀p ≥ 1, Dθ = Dp and
R
(
Vθ(p)Λ
T
θ(p)
)
⊆ R
(
Vτ (p)Λ
T
τ (p)
)
.
Thus, by Theorem 2, we can obtain that[
J−1
Θ
]
1:Dθ
= J−1A0 . (48)
In addition, by employing (17), (18) and (19), (47) is equiva-
lent to that for all j ∈ Ap, all k, and all r,
∂p
(k)
jr
∂θ
= λp
∂p
(k)
jr
∂τ (p)
. (49)
Noticing by (5), in order to render (49) be assured for any θ,
τ (p) and {I(r)j }, the adversaries need to ensure that for any θ
and τ (p),
∂
∂θ
gjk
(
xjk
∣∣∣θ, τ (p)) = λp ∂
∂τ (p)
gjk
(
xjk
∣∣∣θ, τ (p)) (50)
for all j ∈ Ap and all k.
It is clear that if
gjk
(
xjk
∣∣∣θ, τ (p)) = g˜jk (xjk ∣∣∣λpθ + τ (p)) , (51)
for some g˜jk, then (50) holds. On the other hand, if (50) is
true for any θ and τ (p), then ∀l = 1, 2, ..., Dθ,
(1,−λp)

 ∂∂θl gjk
(
xjk
∣∣∣{θm}m 6=l, {τ (p)m }m 6=l, θl, τ (p)l )
∂
∂τ
(p)
l
gjk
(
xjk
∣∣∣{θm}m 6=l, {τ (p)m }m 6=l, θl, τ (p)l )


= 0 (52)
for any θ and τ (p). This implies that for any θl and
τ
(p)
l , the gradient of gjk(xjk |{θm}m 6=l, {τ
(p)
m }m 6=l, θl, τ
(p)
l )
with respect to [θl, τ (p)l ]T is perpendicular to the vector
[1,−λp]T . Thus, if we change [θl, τ (p)l ]T in the direction
[1,−λp]T , then gjk(xjk|{θm}m 6=l, {τ
(p)
m }m 6=l, θl, τ
(p)
l ) does
8not change. Thus, any equivalent change in the perpendicu-
lar direction to [1,−λp]T will produce the same change in
gjk(xjk |{θm}m 6=l, {τ
(p)
m }m 6=l, θl, τ
(p)
l ). Therefore, for any l,
if
(λp, 1)
(
0
t
)
= (λp, 1)
(
θl
τ
(p)
l
)
, (53)
that is, t = λpθl + τ (p)l , then we can obtain that
gjk
(
xjk
∣∣∣{θm}m 6=l, {τ (p)m }m 6=l, 0, t)
= gjk
(
xjk
∣∣∣{θm}m 6=l, {τ (p)m }m 6=l, θl, τ (p)l ) . (54)
As a result, for any l, by employing (54) and defining
g¯jk,l
(
xjk
∣∣∣{θm}m 6=l, {τ (p)m }m 6=l, t)
∆
= gjk
(
xjk
∣∣∣{θm}m 6=l, {τ (p)m }m 6=l, 0, t) , (55)
we can express gjk(xjk |{θm}m 6=l, {τ
(p)
m }m 6=l, θl, τ
(p)
l ) as
gjk
(
xjk
∣∣∣{θm}m 6=l, {τ (p)m }m 6=l, θl, τ (p)l )
= g¯jk,l
(
xjk
∣∣∣{θm}m 6=l, {τ (p)m }m 6=l, λpθl + τ (p)l ) (56)
for some g¯jk,l, which implies that
gjk
(
xjk
∣∣∣θ, τ (p)) = g˜jk (xjk ∣∣∣λpθ + τ (p)) (57)
for some g˜jk.
As demonstrated by Corollary 1, if the spoofing attack
gives rise to an after-attack pdf gjk(xjk|θ, τ (p)) which is only
parameterized by the sum of λpθ and τ (p) for any λp, then
the spoofing attack is optimal in the sense of Definition 4. This
class of OESAs is interesting and powerful in practice, since
their optimality is independent of the values of the desired
vector parameter and the attack vector parameter. The DRFM
example discussed in the introduction which introduces a time
delay is one example of this class of OESAs (with λp = 1).
For the scenario where the desired parameter is the mean of
the observations, which is a popular signal model for sensor
network estimation systems with quantized data [7], [13]–[15],
this class of OESAs can be easily launched by just adding an
offset to the measurements at each attacked sensor.
Another representative example of the class of OESAs
described by (46) is extensively considered in smart grid
systems under the name data-injection attacks, see [4], [18]–
[20] and the references therein. At time instant k, the direct
current power flow model in the absence of spoofing attacks
can be expressed as
xk = Hθ + nk. (58)
Considering the p-th data-injection attack, the after-attack
measurements from the sensors in Ap at time instant k are
given by
[x˜k]Ap = [xk]Ap + a
(p) = [H]Ap,:θ + a
(p) + [nk]Ap , (59)
where a(p) represents the data injected by the p-th spoofing
attack. If the adversaries choose a(p) such that
a(p) = [H]Ap,:τ
(p) (60)
for some τ (p), then the after-attack measurements from the
sensors in Ap can be equivalently written as
[x˜k]Ap = [H]Ap,:
(
θ + τ (p)
)
+ [nk]Ap , (61)
and therefore, (46) is satisfied by the data-injection attack.
Further, by Corollary 1, the CRB for θ is maximized in
the positive semidefinite sense if all the attacks are of this
type. Moreover, it can be shown that the stealth attack or
undetectable attack in [4], [18], [20], which attracts extensive
attention in recent literature on smart grids, is just such an
attack with P = 1.
In addition to the class of OESAs described in (46), there
are many other OESAs. For example, if the p-th spoofing
attack satisfies that ∀j ∈ Ap and for all k, gjk(xjk|θ, τ (p)) =
g˜jk(xjk|hjk(θ, τ
(p))) for some g˜jk and some symmetric func-
tion hjk of θ and τ (p), then it can be shown that the p-th
spoofing attack is an OESA provided that the values of τ (p)
and θ are equal.
C. Discussion
Under the conditions of Definition 1, it is clear that J−1A0
is an upper bound on the CRB for θ, no matter what kind
of attacks have been launched. From (31) and Theorem 2, the
CRB for θ under ISA or OESA equals to its upper bound J−1A0 .
Therefore, according to Definition 1, both ISA and OESA are
OGDSAs. Furthermore, note that Λτ (p) is a Dp×(
∑
j∈Ap
Rj)
matrix, and hence, rank(Λτ (p)) ≤ Dp. Thus, any OGDSA is
either an ISA when rank(Λτ (p)) < Dp, or an OESA when
rank(Λτ (p)) = Dp.
A particular note of interest is that the results in Section
III-A and III-B can be used to judge whether the attacked
measurements are useful or not in terms of reducing CRB
under the conditions of Definition 1. In particular, it is seen
from (31) and Theorem 2 that the CRB for θ in the presence
of ISA or OESA is the same as the CRB for θ when
only unattacked data is used. Thus, we obtain the following
corollary.
Corollary 2: Under the conditions of Definition 1, the
necessary and sufficient condition under which the attacked
measurements are useless in terms of reducing CRB is that
the spoofing attacks belong to either ISA or OESA which are
defined in Definition 2 and 4 respectively.
However, the fundamental mechanisms of ISA and OESA
for making the attacked measurements useless in terms of
reducing CRB are very different. To be specific, ISA renders
the task of estimating the attack vector parameters beyond
the capabilities of the quantized estimation system by causing
the FIM for jointly estimating the desired and attack vector
parameters to be singular. Thus, ISA prevents the FC from
potentially improving the CRB for θ by jointly estimating
θ and the attack vector parameters. In contrast, even though
the joint FIM is nonsingular, the FC is not able to obtain
any improvement from using the attacked data in the CRB
performance for θ under OESA.
It is worth mentioning that (31) and Theorem 2 demonstrate
that under the conditions of Definition 1, the CRB for θ
reaches its upper bound in the presence of ISA or OESA. In
9practice, however, the FC may not be able to well identify the
set of unattacked sensors and categorize the attacked sensors
into different groups according to distinct types of spoofing
attacks. Thus, the actual estimation performance under ISA
and OESA can be expected to be inferior to J−1A0 .
In the case where for any j, {x˜jk} is a statistically in-
dependent and identically distributed sequence over k, then
in Theorem 1, the sufficient condition in (24) will become
Dp >
∑
j∈Ap
Rj − |Ap|. Now the right-hand side of the
inequality is just the sum of the sizes of the alphabet sets
employed at the sensors under the p-th spoofing attack minus
the size of Ap. This quantity even does not depend on the
number of temporal measurements at each attacked sensor. In
addition, it can be shown that the results in this section can be
easily extended to the cases where the attack vector parameters
employed at the attacked sensors change over time, that is, the
after-attack observation x˜jk obeys the statistical model
x˜jk ∼
{
fjk (x˜jk |θ ) , if j ∈ U
gjk
(
x˜jk
∣∣θ, ξ(j,k) ) , if j ∈ V , (62)
where ξ(j,k) is the attack vector parameter employed at time
instant k at the j-th sensor. For the sake of brevity, we skip
the extension.
IV. JOINT ATTACK IDENTIFICATION AND PARAMETER
ESTIMATION UNDER ESTIMABLE SPOOFING ATTACK
In order to corroborate the theory just described, we de-
velop a representative approach for the joint identification of
attacked sensors along with the estimation of the desired vector
parameter and the attack vector parameters for the estimation
system facing attacks. In this section, we focus on a class
of estimable spoofing attacks in which for any p, ∀j ∈ Ap,
the FIM for τ (p) based on the data from the j-th sensor is
nonsingular. Further, we assume that JA0 defined in (16) is
nonsingular in the presence of spoofing attacks. This could
occur, for example, if only a small subset of sensors can be
attacked in a distributed sensor setting or if a subset of sensors
can be well protected in advance to give rise to a nonsingular
JA0 .
In this section, we use {ξ(j)}Nj=1 instead of {τ (p)}Pp=1 to
denote the attack vector parameters employed by the adver-
saries at the j-th sensor. For the sake of notational simplicity,
we let q(k)jr and q˜
(k)
jr to denote the r-th value of the after-
attack pmf of the k-th time sample at the j-th sensor when it
is unattacked and attacked respectively
q
(k)
jr
∆
=
∫
I
(r)
j
fjk (xjk |θ ) dxjk (63)
and
q˜
(k)
jr
∆
=
∫
I
(r)
j
gjk
(
xjk
∣∣∣θ, ξ(j)) dxjk, (64)
where fjk and gjk represent the pdf of the k-th time sample at
the j-th sensor when it is unattacked and attacked respectively.
Before proceeding, the following assumptions are made
from a practical viewpoint in this section.
Assumption 1: As the sensors are assumed to be spread
over a wide area and typically adversaries have limited re-
sources, we assume that no more than half of sensors are
attacked.
Assumption 2 (Significant Attack): In order to give rise to
sufficient impact on the statistical characterization of the mea-
surements at each attacked sensors, every attacker is required
to guarantee a minimum average distortion of the pmf at each
attacked sensor, that is,
1
Kj
Kj∑
k=1
∥∥∥q˜(k)j − q(k)j ∥∥∥
2
≥ dq, ∀j /∈ A0, (65)
where q(k)j and q˜
(k)
j are defined as
q
(k)
j
∆
=
[
q
(k)
j1 , q
(k)
j2 , ..., q
(k)
jRj
]T
(66)
and
q˜
(k)
j
∆
=
[
q˜
(k)
j1 , q˜
(k)
j2 , ..., q˜
(k)
jRj
]T
. (67)
We do not consider modifications smaller than (65) as attacks
and assume they have little impact on performance. Assump-
tion 1 is made for avoiding the ambiguity between the attacked
and unattacked sensors.
Let Ω denote a vector containing the desired vector param-
eter θ, the set of unknown attack vector parameters {ξ(j)} as
well as a set of unknown binary state variables {ηj} that
Ω
∆
=
[
ΞT ,ηT
]T
, (68)
where
Ξ
∆
=
[
θT ,
(
ξ(1)
)T
,
(
ξ(2)
)T
, ...,
(
ξ(N)
)T]T
(69)
and
η
∆
= [η1, η2, ..., ηN ]
T
. (70)
The j-th element of η is zero, i.e., ηj = 0, if the j-th sensor is
unattacked, while ηj = 1 implies the j-th sensor is attacked.
The log-likelihood function evaluated at u˜ = r is
L (Ω)
∆
= lnPr (u˜ = r |Ω)
=
N∑
j=1
Kj∑
k=1
[
ηj ln q˜
(k)
jrjk
+ (1− ηj) ln q
(k)
jrjk
]
. (71)
Based on this setting, the FC can jointly identify the state of
each sensor and estimate the desired vector parameter θ by
solving the following constrained optimization problem
Ωˆ = argmax
Ω
N∑
j=1
Kj∑
k=1
[
ηj ln q˜
(k)
jrjk
+ (1− ηj) ln q
(k)
jrjk
]
(72a)
s. t. ηj ∈ {0, 1} , ∀j, (72b)
N∑
j=1
ηj <
N
2
, (72c)
1
Kj
Kj∑
k=1
∥∥∥q˜(k)j − q(k)j ∥∥∥
2
≥ dq, ∀ηj = 1, (72d)
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where the constraints in (72c) and (72d) are due to Assumption
1 and Assumption 2.
The integer constraint in (72b) makes the optimization
problem difficult to solve. For small N , it may be solved
exactly simply by exhaustively searching through all possible
combinations of {ηj}, while for large N , this is not feasible
in practice, since the number of all possible combination of
{ηj} is on the order of 2N . To this end, it is of considerable
practical interest to develop an efficient algorithm to solve the
optimization problem in (72). In this section, we propose a
heuristic for solving (72).
A. Random Relaxation with the EM Algorithm
According to the constraint in (72b), ηj is an unknown
deterministic binary variable, and hence, (72b) is equivalent
to
pij
∆
= Pr (ηj=1) ∈ {0, 1} and Pr (ηj=0) = 1−pij, ∀j. (73)
Further, by dropping the constraint (72c) as well as (72d),
and then relaxing the deterministic {ηj} to be random, that is,
allowing pij = Pr (ηj = 1) ∈ [0, 1] for all j = 1, 2, ..., N , the
problem in (72) reduces to
Ωˆpi = argmax
Ωpi
N∑
j=1
Kj∑
k=1
ln
[
pij q˜
(k)
jrjk
+ (1− pij) q
(k)
jrjk
]
(74a)
s. t. pij ∈ [0, 1], ∀j = 1, 2, ..., N, (74b)
where Ωpi
∆
= [ΞT ,piT ]T and pi ∆= [pi1, pi2..., piN ]T .
The physical interpretation behind (74) is that via random
relaxation of the deterministic binary vector state variable η,
the set A0 of unattacked sensors is no longer deterministic,
and moreover, each sensor in the sensor network is attacked
with a certain probability pij at every time instant.
By introducing a latent vector variable
z = [z11, z12, ..., z1K1 , z21, ..., zNKN ]
T , (75)
where zjk = 1 indicates that the k-th measurement at the
j-th sensor was attacked, and zjk = 0 implies that the k-
th measurement at the j-th sensor was unattacked, we can
employ the Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm [28],
[29], which is an iterative method that alternates between
performing an expectation (E) step and a maximization (M)
step, to solve the relaxed problem in (74).
1) E-step: The E-step computes the expected log-likelihood
function Q(Ωpi|Ω′pi), with respect to z given the quantized
data u˜ = r and the current estimate of the vector parameter
Ωˆ′pi = [(Ξˆ
′)T , (pˆi′)T ]T , as following
Q
(
Ωpi
∣∣∣Ωˆ′pi ) ∆= Ez|Ωˆ′pi ,u˜=r {L (Ωpi)} , (76)
where the log-likelihood function L (Ωpi) is given by
L (Ωpi) = lnPr (z, u˜ = r|Ωpi)
= lnPr ( u˜ = r|Ωpi, z) + lnPr (z|Ωpi)
=
N∑
j=1
Kj∑
k=1
{
1{zjk=1}
(
ln q˜
(k)
jrjk
+ lnpij
)
+1{zjk=0}
[
ln q
(k)
jrjk
+ ln (1− pij)
]}
. (77)
Define
υ
(1)
jk
∆
=E
z|Ωˆ′pi,u˜=r
{
1{zjk=1}
}
=
pˆi′j q˜
(k)
jrjk
pˆi′j q˜
(k)
jrjk
+
(
1− pˆi′j
)
q
(k)
jrjk
(78)
and
υ
(0)
jk
∆
= E
z|Ωˆ′pi,u˜=r
{
1{zjk=0}
}
= 1− υ
(1)
jk , (79)
then by employing (76) and (77), we can obtain the expected
log-likelihood function
Q
(
Ωpi
∣∣∣Ωˆ′pi ) = N∑
j=1
Kj∑
k=1
{
υ
(1)
jk
(
ln q˜
(k)
jrjk
+ lnpij
)
+υ
(0)
jk
[
ln q
(k)
jrjk
+ ln (1− pij)
]}
. (80)
2) M-step: The M-step seeks to find a new estimate of
the vector parameter Ωˆpi to update the current estimate of
the vector parameter Ωˆ′pi by maximizing the expected log-
likelihood function Q(Ωpi|Ωˆ′pi), that is,
Ωˆpi =
[
ΞˆT , pˆiT
]T
= argmax
Ωpi
Q
(
Ωpi
∣∣∣Ωˆ′pi ) . (81)
a) Updated estimate of pi: According to (81), the up-
dated estimate pˆij should satisfy
∂Q
(
Ωpi
∣∣∣Ωˆ′pi )
∂pij
=
1
pij
Kj∑
k=1
υ
(1)
jk −
1
1− pij
Kj∑
k=1
υ
(0)
jk = 0, (82)
which yields, by employing (79),
pˆij =
1
Kj
Kj∑
k=1
υ
(1)
jk . (83)
b) Updated estimate of Ξ: Similarly, the updated esti-
mate Ξˆ is the solution of the following equation
∇ΞQ
(
Ωpi
∣∣∣Ωˆ′pi ) = 0. (84)
Generally, a closed-form solution for the above equation may
not exist. To solve (84) in such cases, Newton’s method can
be employed with an initial point Ξˆ(0) = Ξˆ′. At the (i+1)-th
iteration of Newton’s Method, the updated point Ξˆ(t+1) can
be expressed as
Ξˆ(t+1)
= Ξˆ(t) − κt
[
∇2
Ξ
Q
(
Ω(t)pi
∣∣∣Ωˆ′pi )]−1∇ΞQ(Ω(t)pi ∣∣∣Ωˆ′pi ) (85)
where Ω(t)pi = [(Ξˆ(t))T , (pˆi′)T ]T , and κt ∈ (0, 1) is the t-th
step size computed by using a backtracking line search [30].
For completeness, the explicit expressions for the gradient
and Hessian of the expected log-likelihood function with re-
spect to Ξ are provided. The gradient ∇ΞQ(Ω(t)pi |Ωˆ′pi) consists
of the quantities ∂
∂θl
Q(Ω
(t)
pi |Ωˆ′pi) and ∂∂ξ(j)
l
Q(Ω
(t)
pi |Ωˆ′pi) for
different j and l, which can be computed by
∂
∂θl
Q
(
Ω(t)pi
∣∣∣Ωˆ′pi )
=
N∑
j=1
Kj∑
k=1

υ(1)jk 1q˜(k)jrjk
∂
∂θl
q˜
(k)
jrjk
+ υ
(0)
jk
1
q
(k)
jrjk
∂
∂θl
q
(k)
jrjk

 (86)
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and
∂
∂ξ
(j)
l
Q
(
Ω(t)pi
∣∣∣Ωˆ′pi ) =
Kj∑
k=1
υ
(1)
jk
1
q˜
(k)
jrjk
∂
∂ξ
(j)
l
q˜
(k)
jrjk
. (87)
The elements of the Hessian ∇2
Ξ
Q(Ω
(t)
pi |Ωˆ′pi) can be calculated
by the following expressions
∂2
∂θl∂θm
Q
(
Ω(t)pi
∣∣∣Ωˆ′pi )
=
N∑
j=1
Kj∑
k=1

υ(1)jk

 1
q˜
(k)
jrjk
∂2q˜
(k)
jrjk
∂θl∂θm
−
1
(q˜
(k)
jrjk
)2
∂q˜
(k)
jrjk
∂θl
∂q˜
(k)
jrjk
∂θm


+υ
(0)
jk

 1
q
(k)
jrjk
∂2q
(k)
jrjk
∂θl∂θm
−
1
(q
(k)
jrjk
)2
∂q
(k)
jrjk
∂θl
∂q
(k)
jrjk
∂θm



 , (88)
∂2
∂θl∂ξ
(j)
m
Q
(
Ω(t)pi
∣∣∣Ωˆ′pi )
=
Kj∑
k=1
υ
(1)
jk

 1
q˜
(k)
jrjk
∂2q˜
(k)
jrjk
∂θl∂ξ
(j)
m
−
1
(q˜
(k)
jrjk
)2
∂q˜
(k)
jrjk
∂θl
∂q˜
(k)
jrjk
∂ξ
(j)
m

, (89)
∂2
∂ξ
(j)
l ∂ξ
(j)
m
Q
(
Ω(t)pi
∣∣∣Ωˆ′pi )
=
Kj∑
k=1
υ
(1)
jk

 1
q˜
(k)
jrjk
∂2q˜
(k)
jrjk
∂ξ
(j)
l ∂ξ
(j)
m
−
1
(q˜
(k)
jrjk
)2
∂q˜
(k)
jrjk
∂ξ
(j)
l
∂q˜
(k)
jrjk
∂ξ
(j)
m

, (90)
and
∂2
∂ξ
(i)
l ∂ξ
(j)
m
Q
(
Ω(t)pi
∣∣∣Ωˆ′pi ) = 0, if i 6= j. (91)
The quantities in (86)–(91) are all evaluated at Ω(t)pi . Repeating
the calculation of (85) until {Ξˆ(t)} converges, the limit point
Ξˆ of {Ξˆ(t)} is the solution for (84), and also the updated
estimate of Ξ.
The convergence of the EM algorithm is guaranteed and
the detailed analysis can be found in [28], [31], that is to
say, by iteratively alternating between E-step and M-step, a
locally optimal solution for (74) can be obtained. It is worth
mentioning that since we do not require a very accurate
solution for the relaxed optimization problem in (74), once
the difference between the updated and current estimates
is sufficiently small, we can terminate the iterations in the
EM algorithm and utilize the current estimate of Ωpi in the
following rounding step.
B. Constrained Variable Threshold Rounding and Barrier
Method
By utilizing the EM algorithm as illustrated in Section IV-A,
we can obtain the solution Ωˆpi for the relaxed optimization
problem in (74). The element pˆij of Ωˆpi can be interpreted as
the probability of the j-th sensor being attacked over time.
However, according to (72c) and (73), we know that before
relaxation, pˆij ∈ {0, 1} and 1T pˆi < N/2. To this end, we
consider the task of rounding pˆi to a valid binary vector.
To accomplish this task, we propose a constrained variable
threshold rounding (CVTR) approach which is based on the
heuristic developed by Zymnis et al. [32]. The basic idea of
the CVTR is that we first round pˆi to generate a set of most
likely probability vectors {p˜i(l)} with binary elements which
satisfy the constraints in (72c). Then, under constraint (72d),
the joint maximum likelihood estimate of the desired vector
parameter and attack vector parameters are pursued over the
generated set of valid probability binary vectors {p˜i(l)}.
We first generate the set of the most likely valid binary
probability vectors {p˜i(l)} by employing the CVTR which can
be described as{
p˜i(l)
}
∆
=
{
sgn (pˆi − λ1) : 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1,
‖sgn (pˆi − λ1)‖1 <
N
2
}
. (92)
Since the j-th element p˜i(l)j of p˜i(l) denotes the probability the
j-th sensor is attacked, each probability vector p˜i(l) with binary
values corresponds to a deterministic state variable vector η˜(l)
as following
η˜(l) = p˜i(l), ∀l. (93)
We refer to {η˜(l)} as the set of the most likely state variable
vectors, and we only consider the combinations in this set.
Further, it is seen from (92) that as λ increases from 0 to 1,
this approach only generates up to ⌊N/2⌋ distinct valid binary
probability vectors. Thus, it is feasible to exhaustively evaluate
the maximum likelihood function, which is maximized with
respect to Ξ, for each given η˜(l). As a result, the optimization
problem in (72) can be reduced to
ΩˆR =
[
ΞˆTR, ηˆ
T
R
]T
= arg max
η∈{η˜(l)}
max
Ξ
L (Ω) (94a)
s. t.
1
Kj
Kj∑
k=1
∥∥∥q˜(k)j − q(k)j ∥∥∥
2
≥ dq, ∀ηj = 1. (94b)
As (94) demonstrates, we need to solve the inner maximiza-
tion for each candidate state variable vector η˜(l), and then keep
the solution which gives rise to the maximal objective function
in (94). Noticing that the constraint in (94b) only has effects
on the inner maximization, the inner constrained maximization
for each η˜(l) in (94) can be converted to an unconstrained
problem by employing a logarithmic barrier function as
max
Ξ


N∑
j=1
Kj∑
k=1
[
η˜
(l)
j ln q˜
(k)
jrjk
+
(
1− η˜
(l)
j
)
ln q
(k)
jrjk
]
+µ
N∑
j=1
η˜
(l)
j ln

 1
Kj
Kj∑
k=1
∥∥∥q˜(k)j − q(k)j ∥∥∥
2
− dq



 , (95)
where the positive barrier parameter µ determines the ac-
curacy with which (95) approximates the inner constrained
maximization in (94). Since the objective function in (95)
is differentiable, the unconstrained problem in (95) can be
similarly solved by Newton’s Method as in Section IV-A2b
for any given µ.
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Let Ξˆ(l)µ denote the solution of (95) for any given η˜(l) and µ,
and let L(l)∗ represent the optimal objective value of the inner
constrained maximization in (94a) for any given η˜(l). It can
be shown that as µ→ 0, any limit point Ξˆ(l)∗ of the sequence
{Ξˆ
(l)
µ }µ is a solution of the inner constrained maximization
in (94) [33]. Thus, we can obtain an accurate solution of the
inner constrained maximization in (94) by iteratively solving
(95) for a sequence {µm} of positive barrier parameters, which
decrease monotonically to zero, such that the solution Ξˆ(l)µm
for µm is chosen as the starting point for the next iteration
with barrier parameter µm+1. By defining l∗
∆
= maxl L
(l)
∗ , the
solution of the constrained optimization problem in (94) can
be obtained as
ΩˆR =
[
ΞˆR, ηˆR
]T
=
[(
Ξˆ
(l∗)
∗
)T
,
(
η˜(l
∗)
)T]T
. (96)
C. Discussion
It is well known that the condition number of the Hessian
matrix of the logarithmic barrier function in (95) might be-
come increasingly larger as the barrier parameter decreases to
0. In order to overcome the ill-conditioning issue in practical
computation, the numerically stable approximation of the
Newton direction can be utilized in Newton’s method for
solving (95) with small barrier parameter, see [33] and the
references therein. It is worth mentioning that to preserve the
generality, we don’t make additional assumptions to ensure the
convexity of the objective functions in the section. Hence, the
EM algorithm and Newton’s method involved in our approach
might converge to a locally optimal point if the starting point
is not close to the globally optimal point. To avoid this
possibility, multiple starting points can be employed and we
choose the one that yields the maximal objective function at
convergence [27].
The proposed approach in (94)–(96) attempts to use all
sensor data, whether attacked or not, in an attempt to optimize
the described objective function. Thus, for some scenarios
where the spoofing attacks are not OGDSAs, similar to [7], one
expects the proposed approach will outperform the estimation
approach which only utilizes the unattacked data to estimate
the desired vector parameter. For example, please refer to the
numerical results in Section V-C.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we investigate the performance of the ap-
proaches proposed in Section IV for some practical cases. The
numerical results show that under OGDSAs, the approaches
proposed in Section IV are not able to obtain performance
that is better than the optimal performance which ignores the
attacked sensors, which is consistent with the theory described
in Section III.
A. DRFM Attacks in MIMO Radars
First, we consider MIMO radar with 1 transmit station
and N = 10 moderately spaced receive stations under the
spoofing attack using a DRFM in a generalization of (6)–
(9). The first 3 receive stations are under attack. Each station
makes M measurements of each pulse in the pulse train, and
employs an identical 4-bit quantizer with a set of thresholds
{−∞,−5,−4, ..., 9,∞} to convert analog measurements to
quantized data before transmitting them to the FC. Without
any attack, the m-th measurement of the k-th pulse in the
pulse train at the j-th station can be expressed as
x
(k)
jm =
√
Ejajs
(
t
(k)
jm − θj
)
+ n
(k)
jm, (97)
where θj is the desired parameter, m = 1, 2, ...,M , k =
1, 2, ...,K , and K is the total number of pulses in the pulse
train. Similar to (8), if the j-th station is under attack, the
m-th measurement of the k-th pulse in the pulse train is
x˜
(k)
jm =
√
Ejajs
(
t
(k)
jm − θj − ξj
)
+ n
(k)
jm, (98)
where ξj is the delay introduced by the DRFM.
Assume {n(k)jm} is an independent and identically distributed
zero-mean Gaussian noise sequence with variance σ2. The
signal s (t) is a Gaussian pulse signal [34], that is,
s (t) =
(
2
T 2
) 1
4
exp
(
−
pit2
T 2
)
, (99)
and the sampling times are t(k)jm = (m − 1)∆t, ∀m =
1, 2, ...,M . Moreover, we assume the distance between the
target and any receiving station is much larger than the
distance between every pair of stations, and hence, we can
assume θj = θ for all j. In the simulations, let T = 0.1,
∆t = 0.001, θ = 0.02, M = 3, σ2 = 5, and Ej = 1,
aj = 1 for all j. In addition, the values of the attack parameters
are ξ1 = 0.04, ξ2 = 0.05, ξ3 = 0.06, and the threshold
defined in Assumption 2 in (65) is dq = 0.15. We first test
the performance of the approach which employs the random
relaxation (RR) with the EM and CVTR in identifying the
attacked and unattacked sensors. Fig. 2 illustrates the Monte
Carlo approximation (1000 times) of the ensemble average of
the percentage of all mis-classified sensors as a function of the
number K of pulses in the pulse train. As Fig. 2 shows, the
average percentage of mis-classified sensors decreases towards
0 as K increases.
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Fig. 2: Performance of identifying the DRFM attacks.
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Next, we examine the estimation performance of the pro-
posed approaches in Section IV, that is, the approach which
employs the RR with the EM, and the approach that employs
the RR with the EM and CVTR. Fig. 3 depicts the mean
squared error (MSE) performance of the two approaches for
estimating θ on a log scale. For comparison, in Fig. 3, the
CRB for θ which knows which sensors are attacked and only
uses data from unattacked sensors is also provided5. It is seen
that as K increases, the MSE performance of the approach
with CVTR for estimating θ converges to the CRB for θ
which knows which sensors are attacked and only uses data
from unattacked sensors. The large K results in Fig. 3 also
corroborates the previous theoretical results in Section III that
under OESAs, the attacked data are not useful to reduce the
CRB. In addition, the MSE performance of the approach with
CVTR is shown to be better than the approach which only
employs the RR with the EM algorithm, which implies that the
proposed constrained variable threshold rounding can further
improve the estimation performance for estimating the deisred
parameter.
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Unattacked data only CRB for θ
Fig. 3: Estimation performance of the proposed approaches
under DRFM attacks.
B. Data-injection Attacks in Sensor Networks
Next consider the specific attacks on the range-based lo-
calization system described in [3]. The attackers modify the
receivers to alter the received signal strength to confuse the
localization. Consider a case with N = 10 closely spaced
sensors. Each sensor makes K measurements of the physical
phenomenon, and employs an identical 4-bit quantizer with a
set of thresholds {0,±1,±2, ...,±7,±∞} to convert analog
measurements to quantized data before transmitting them to
the FC. From [3], the received signal strength before attack is
xjk = θ + njk, ∀k and ∀j, (100)
where θ is a deterministic unknown parameter, and {njk} is
an i.i.d. zero-mean Gaussian noise sequence with distribution
5It is worth mentioning that the CRB for θ which knows which sensors are
attacked and only uses data from unattacked sensors is equal to the CRB for
estimating θ under ISA. Hence, the blue curve marked with squares in Fig.3
also indicates the CRB performance under ISA.
N (0, σ2). Here, we estimate θ which allows us to directly
calculate the common distance to the emitter, due to a one-to-
one relationship. Further, we assume that the first 3 sensors in
the sensor network are under data-injection spoofing attacks.
The after-attack measurements are described as
x˜jk = θ + ajk + njk, ∀k and ∀j = 1, 2, 3, (101)
where ajk is the unknown attack injected at the j-th sensor at
time k.
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Fig. 4: Performance of identifying the data-injection attacks.
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Fig. 5: Estimation performance of the proposed approaches
for estimating θ.
We consider the scenario that θ and σ2 are both the
parameters of interest. Moreover, the unknown injected attacks
{ajk} are independent random variables, where ajk obeys the
Gaussian distribution N (αj , βj) for all k. In the simulations,
the desired vector parameter θ ∆= [θ, σ2]T and the attack
vector parameters {ξ(j) ∆= [αj , βj ]T }j=1,2,3 are θ = [1, 3]T ,
ξ(1) = [−1.5, 1]T , ξ(2) = [−2, 2]T , and ξ(3) = [1.5, 1]T .
The threshold defined in Assumption 2 in (65) is dq = 0.04.
The performance of the approach which employs the RR with
the EM and CVTR in identifying the attacked and unattacked
sensors is illustrated in Fig. 4. Fig. 4 depicts the Monte Carlo
approximation (1000 times) of the ensemble average of the
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Fig. 6: Estimation performance of the proposed approaches
for estimating σ2.
percentage of all mis-classified sensors versus the number K
of time samples at each sensor. It is seen from Fig. 4 that the
average percentage of mis-classified sensors reduces towards
0 as K increases. In Fig. 5 and Fig. 6, we plot the MSE
performance of our proposed approaches for jointly estimating
θ and σ2 on a log scale. The CRBs for estimating θ and σ2
which know which sensors are attacked and only use data
from unattacked sensors are also respectively plotted in Fig.
5 and Fig. 6 for comparison. As Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 show, the
MSEs of the approach which employs the RR with the EM and
CVTR for jointly estimating θ and σ2 respectively converge
to the corresponding CRBs which know which sensors are
attacked and only uses data from unattacked sensors, and
outperform the approach which only employs the RR with
the EM algorithm. The large K results in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6
again justify the previous theoretical results in Section III that
under OESAs, attacked data is not useful to reduce the CRB.
Note that the model in (100) is the most studied model in
the sensor network estimation literature, typically employed
for nonlocalization applications. Thus, the analysis is useful
in these other applications also.
C. Data-injection Attacks in MIMO Radars
It is worth mentioning that the data-injection attacks are
OGDSAs for the specific estimation problem described in Sec-
tion V-B, but they may not satisfy the necessary and sufficient
conditions for an OGDSA for other estimation problems. To
demonstrate this, we consider the data-injection attacks in the
time delay estimation problem described in Section V-A. To
be specific, if the j-th station is under a data-injection attack,
rather than (98), the m-th after-attack measurement of the k-th
pulse in the pulse train is
x˜
(k)
jm =
√
Ejajs
(
t
(k)
jm − θj
)
+ ξj + n
(k)
jm, (102)
where the signal s(t) is defined in (99), {n(k)jm} is an inde-
pendent and identically distributed zero-mean Gaussian noise
sequence with variance σ2, and the sampling times are t(k)jm =
(m − 1)∆t, ∀m = 1, 2, ...,M . In the following simulations,
the values of most of system parameters are set to be the same
as those in Section V-A, except that M = 40 and the values
of the attack parameters are ξ1 = 1, ξ2 = −2 and ξ3 = −1.
In addition, the threshold defined in Assumption 2 in (65) is
chosen to be dq = 0.075.
We first examine the performance of the proposed approach
in identifying the attacked and unattacked sensors in the
presence of data-injection attacks in the time delay estimation
problem. Fig. 7 depicts the Monte Carlo approximation (500
times) of the ensemble average of the percentage of all mis-
classified sensors versus the number K of pulses in the pulse
train. It is seen that the average percentage of mis-classified
sensors reduces to 0 very rapidly as K increases. Fig. 8
presents the MSE performance of the proposed estimation
approaches for estimating θ plotted on a log scale. The CRB
for estimating θ which knows which sensors are attacked and
uses data from all sensors is also plotted in Fig. 8 along with
the CRB for estimating θ which knows which sensors are
attacked but only uses data from unattacked sensors. Fig. 8
shows that the CRB which uses only the unattacked sensor
data is strictly larger than the CRB which uses all the data. In
an OGDSA, the data at the attacked sensor cannot be used to
improve performance as stated in Section III. Thus the results
in Fig. 8 illustrate that the data-injection attack is not OGDSA
for the time delay estimation problem in (102). This can also
be verified using our theory. Interestingly, each of the EM-
based approaches we described provides an MSE very close
to the CRB from using all data, as shown in Fig. 8.
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Fig. 7: Performance of identifying the data-injection attacks
in the time delay estimation problem.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study the distributed estimation of a
deterministic vector parameter by using quantized data in the
presence of spoofing attacks. A generalized attack model is
employed which manipulates the data using transformations
with arbitrary functional forms determined by some attack
parameters whose values are unknown to the attacked sys-
tem. Novel necessary and sufficient conditions are provided
under which these transformations provide an OGDSA. It is
shown that an OGDSA implies that either the FIM under the
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Fig. 8: Estimation performance of the proposed approaches
for estimating θ in the presence of the data-injection attacks
in the time delay estimation problem.
conditions of Definition 1 for jointly estimating the desired
and attack parameters is singular or that the attacked system
is unable to improve the CRB under the conditions of Def-
inition 1 for the desired vector parameter even though the
joint FIM is nonsingular. It is demonstrated that it is always
possible to construct an OGDSA by properly employing a
sufficiently large dimension attack vector parameter relative
to the number of quantization levels employed, which was not
observed previously. In addition, we demonstrate that under
the conditions of Definition 1, a spoofing attack can corrupt
the original measurements to make them useless in terms of
reducing the CRB for estimating the desired vector parameter
if and only if it is an OGDSA. In order to illustrate the
theory in a concrete way, we also provide some numerical
results considering some OGDSAs. For a specific class of
OGDSAs, an enhanced EM-based algorithm that attempts to
use all the attacked and unattacked data to jointly estimate
the desired and attack parameters is shown, for a sufficient
number of observations, to essentially achieve the CRB which
knows which sensors are attacked and only uses data from
unattacked sensors. This tallies with the theoretical results
that the attacked data is not useful under an OGDSA. For
completeness, we specify the EM-based algorithm for general
attacks and enhance it with a heuristic rounding approach
previously suggested by others in a different application which
seems to significantly improve the EM-based algorithm.
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